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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, defendant/appellant Marcia S. Merrill

submits the

following Reply Brief in the above-entitled matter.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I.
CVF Land Investments claims that it is entitled to
reimbursement of $13,000.00 in development costs expended on
the

Galloway

property

prior

to

redemption,

since

all

procedures undertaken were mandated by Salt Lake City incident
to a March 1, 1989 demolition order.

CVF Land Investment bore

the burden of proof of this claim, and failed to produce any
evidence whatever to substantiate it.

Neither the "Notice and

Order" which CVF Land Investment attempted to introduce into
evidence, nor the testimony of any witnesses, established or
suggested that Salt Lake City Corporation ordered CVF Land
Investment
property,

to pour
level

1,400

tons

and grade

of

fill material

the same, as part

of

onto

the

a simple

demolition project of one 800-square-foot clapboard house.
POINT II
CVF

Land

Investment

improperly

argues

that

defendant/appellant Merrill is attempting raise theories and
issues for the first time on appeal.

All arguments made

pursuant to this appeal were either explicitly or implicitly

before the trial court, and no new matter has been introduced.
POINT III
CVF Land Investment is in error in claiming that it
is

entitled

Galloway

to

the

property,

value
as

of
it

improvements
did

not

placed

have

defendant/appellant Merrill's redemption rights.

on

the

notice

of

This claim

is not only contrary to law, but to Gloria Ruiz1 own testimony
during the hearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT TO SUPPORT CVF LAND INVESTMENT'S CLAIM
THAT IT WAS REQUIRED TO RE-GRADE AND RAISE
THE GALLOWAY PROPERTY
CVF Land Investment concedes in its responsive brief
that the expenditure of $13,000 for re-grading and raising the
entire

Galloway

property

with

prime-quality

fill

material

would not ordinarily fall within the scope of Rule 69(f)(3) as
a

"reasonable

sum"

for

"necessary maintenance, upkeep, or

repair of any improvements upon the property".

It argues,

though, that the lower court properly awarded this sum as an
addition to the redemption amount, as CVF Land Investment was
acting pursuant to a direct "order" from Salt Lake City.

2

There was no evidence whatever presented to the trial
court to support this claim.1

Neither the "Notice and Order"

produced and offered by CVF Land Investment (Attachment 5 to
Respondent's Brief) nor any other evidence offered during the
hearing established, or even suggested, that in the case of
CVF Land Investment, Salt Lake City made any departure from
the demolition requirements spelled out in its own ordinances,
much

less

demanded

the

sort

of

large-scale,

extensive

reconfiguration of the Galloway property which CVF performed.
A.

The March 2, 1989, Notice And Order Did Not

Require The Re-Grading And Fill Work Performed by CVF Land
Investment.
CVF

Land

Investment

relies

wholly

on

a

document

entitled "Notice and Order", which it claimed justified the
extensive grading, levelling and preparation work performed on
the Galloway property.

X

CVF Land Investment's claim that its reconfiguration of
the Galloway property was pursuant to order of Salt Lake City
constituted an affirmative matter, raised in defense to
defendant Merrill's claim that amounts expended were neither
reasonable nor necessary.
Accordingly, CVF Land Investment
bore the burden of producing proof that its conduct was
pursuant to City order--see In re Swan's Estate, 4 U.2d 277,
293 P.2d 682 (1956); Jay Silversmith, Inc. v. Marchindo, 75
N.M. 290, 404 P.2d 122 (1965); Morrison v. Reilly, 511 P.2d
970 (Wyo. 1973).
3

To

begin

with,

the

document

was

never

properly

authenticated or received into evidence for the purpose of
establishing the truth of its content.

CVF Land Investment's

attempt to introduce the document into evidence generated the
following exchange:
"Q.

Okay.
I show you a document and Ifd
like you to tell me if you are familiar
with that document and exactly what it
is?

A.

It is a notice from the Sheriff's
office, I guess, for Salt Lake to do
that.

Q.

Have you
document?

A.

I must have. I didn't bring my glasses
and I can't really tell what I am
reading. Very embarrassing.

Q.

Would you read what it says on the
notice, at least the first --what the
heading is on that document.

seen

that

before;

that

MR. RAMPTON:
Your Honor, I am going to
object before the document comes into
evidence or its contents.
It needs to be
offered. I believe this is a document that
hasn't been authenticated.
THE COURT: Well, sustained at this point.
I don't think you should have her read from
it until it's been admitted.
MR. PETTEY:
for -THE COURT:

Your Honor, I'd like to submit
Any objection?

4

MR. RAMPTON: This appears to be a document
supposedly
issued
by
Salt
Lake
City
Corporation. It is not a certified document.
There is no certification on it. There is
no authenticating witnesses to state that it
is what it purports to be, so we object to
its being received.
MR. PETTEY:
it --

Mrs. Ruiz, I think you received

THE COURT: Right. It will be admitted; not
necessarily for the truthfulness of its
content, but to explain why she did what she
did. (Transcript pp. 6-7)
CVF Land Investment's "Notice and Order" was never properly
authenticated, either by a subscribing witness or by any other
means

established

by

Rule

901,

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence;

accordingly, it was not properly before the Court, and should
not have been considered as an official document from the City
at all.
Even
however, the

disregarding

this

lack

of

authentication,

"Notice and Order" nowhere requires, or even

implies, that compliance therewith would entail the kind of
massive re-contour of the Galloway property undertaken by CVF
Land Investment.
"found

to

be

Building/Housing
March

1,

1989.

It observes that the Galloway property is
in

violation

of

the

Salt

Lake

City

Ordinances", pursuant to an inspection on
The

order

then

states

that

CVF

Investment's option are (1) demolition; or (2) appeal.
5

Land
The

appeal process is briefly explained.

Attached is a list of

particulars in which the buildings on the Galloway property
did not meet the Uniform Housing Code, which concludes by
observing

that

"because

of

the

above

deficiencies,

the

buildings are determined to be sub-standard and dangerous and
are hereby declared to be a public nuisance which must be
abated by repair, rehabilitation, demolition or removal."
Nowhere in the notice is a word said about regrading
the property, or any portion thereof; about raising the level
of the property, or any portion of it; or about performing any
operation outside the scope of "demolition", the parameters of
which are established by ordinances referenced and discussed
in appellant's opening brief.
Yet on the basis of this document (even assuming it
were

properly

received

in

evidence),

CVF

Land

Investment

maintains that it was justified--in fact required—to expend
seven times the necessary amount in the demolition and removal
of structures on the property.

The document simply fails to

sustain the allegation, and is no evidence at all thereof.
B.

CVF Land Investment Presented No Other Evidence

Whatever To Establish That Salt Lake City Required The ReGrading,

Re-Contouring

and

Re-surfacing

Property.
6
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Land

Investment

makes

1 Ir

Hansen's

"understanding

*"y

implausible, particularly given CVF Land Investment's failure
to produce the alleged declarant of this critical piece of
evidence to testify in his own behalf.2
Yet the lower court, without considering corroborating
evidence from the City itself and in the face of direct
evidence to the contrary, assumed Mr. Hansen's "understanding"
to reflect City requirements accurately, and concluded that

2

Due to the summary nature of a hearing to determine the
proper redemption amount under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendant Merrill was not able to conduct any
meaningful discovery of CVF Land Investment's theories prior
to hearing. For this reason, defendant Merrill was unaware
that CVF
Land
Investments was
intending
to allege
representations by a City representative. Had advance notice
been given, defendant Merrill herself would have produced the
representative, for the purpose of denying the allegation which
Mr. Hansen attempted to attribute to him.
Defendant Merrill, did, however, produce an expert
witness with extensive experience in City demolition projects,
who testified that Mr. Hansen's "understanding" of City
requirements was plainly in error:
Q.

Is there any requirement in the City
that after a house is demolished, the
entire lot must be changed in grade to
that of the surrounding sites?

A.

No.

Q.

So if a house sits lower than a surrounding
site, you don't have to fill that in as part of
the demolition project?

A.

No.

(Transcript at pp. 32-33).
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DEFENDANT MERRILL HAS RAISED NO ISSUES ON
APPEAL WHICH WERE NOT BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
CVF Land Investment argues,

-
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proceeding
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opportunity or j^Gsing argument.
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: . •/

1

1 tner

counsel

the

Under

the

circumstances,

all

issues

raised

in

defendant/appellant Merrill's opening brief must be deemed to
have been expressly or implicitly before the lower court.

The

only possible exception would be Point III of the appellant
brief, which addressed
trial court.

the

"benefit" theory voiced by the

Needless to say, this theory was not addressed

or argued before the lower court, since it was first raised by
the Court itself in the course of its final ruling.
POINT III
CVF LAND INVESTMENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
VALUE OF PRE-REDEMPTION IMPROVEMENTS BASED
ON LACK OF NOTICE
CVF Land Investment argues, at Pages 15-18 of its
brief,

that

pre-redemption

improvements

to

the

Galloway

property are ipso facto rendered "necessary" and "reasonable"
(and therefore compensable pursuant to redemption) because CVF
Land Investment had proceeded in good faith, without notice of
defendant Merrill's intent to redeem.
This argument directly contradicts Gloria Ruiz' own
testimony:
Q.

A,

Okay.
Fine.
Were there other items
that you had anticipated doing to
improve that property, besides the
demolition work?
I had thought that I would want to build
onto it. That was my idea of purchasing
10

it to begin with, because 1 wanted to
build.
Q.

You have not started construction on the
premises?

A.

No, absolutely not.

Q.

Why have you not started construction?

A.

1 was waiting to see what was resolved.
It wasn't mine until —

Q.

You understood this property would not
be yours until the six months redemption
period was over?

A.

Yes. (Transcript
added)

pp.

9-10;

emphasis

In other words, CVF Land Investment had actual notice that,
pending expiration of the six-month redemption period, its
purchase was subject to the redemption rights of other parties
to the lawsuit.

That Marcia Merrill was one of these parties

was a matter of public record, and well known to CVF Land
Investment as such (defendant Merrill, in fact, was the only
other bidder at the judgment sale on February 28, 1989, other
than Mrs. Ruiz and the plaintiffs).
The rule in such cases is stated in the very section
of Corpus Juris Secundum cited at Page 16 of Respondent's
Brief:
One who purchases at a sale to satisfy a
senior encumbrance, without notice of the
existence of a person holding a prior
encumbrance entitling him to redeem from the
11

sale, is entitled to compensation
for
improvements, but it has been held that he is
not entitled to improvements in such a case
where he had notice of the right of such
person to redeem.
15 C.J.S. §37(e)(2), page 645.
It is for this reason that CVF Land

Investment's

attempted analogy to the Occupying Claimant's Statute, 57-61, et seq. , Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) is inapplicable.
That statute deals with the rights of a person who makes
valuable improvements to real property under color of title,
with no notice of outstanding claims of paramount title in any
other person.
Contrary to respondent's argument, Rule 69(f)(3) is
not

intended

improvements
wording,

to
on

the

protect
property

rule

is

those

who

subject

to

intended

to

construct
redemption

permit

a

valuable
By

purchaser

its
to

maintain property during the redemption period—of which he is
chargeable by law with actual notice—until redemptive rights
have either been exercised or have lapsed.
CONCLUSION
The issue before the Court in this appeal is a simple
one.

The facts in evidence before the lower court establish

that

CVF

Land

Investment,

Sheriff's

Sale

and

the

end

between
of
12

the

the

February

subsequent

28,

1989

redemption

period, performed extensive grading and preparation work on
the Galloway property which were not required, by ordinance or
order of Salt

Lake City or by any other reason,

for the

maintenance or upkeep of the property pending expiration of
the redemption period.
that,

based

on

its

Nevertheless, the lower court ruled

misapprehension

of

Salt

Lake

City's

requirements and upon defendant Merrill's presumed receipt of
"benefits" from the work performed, CVF Land Investment was
entitled

to

dollar-for-dollar

reimbursement

for

all

construction costs expended.
It is submitted the Rule 69(f)(3) does not cast the
aspiring

redemptioner

in

the

role

of

guarantor

of

all

development costs incurred by the purchaser at a sheriff's
sale.

Accordingly, the lower court's ruling must be reversed,

and the matter remanded for recalculation of the redemption
amount in accordance with the uncontested evidence before the
lower court.
DATED this >_£

day of February, 1990.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN/
/

Attorneys for Defendant Marcia
S. Merrill
13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith

certify

that

I am a member

of

and/or

employed by the law firm of WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN, 310 South
Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said
capacity and pursuant to Rule 21(d) Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, a true copy of the attached Appellantfs Reply Brief
was caused to be served upon:
Jax H. Pettey
180 South 300 West, #313
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same
in the U, S. Mails, postage prepaid thereon this 2^/
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February, 1990.
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